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Abstract 
We provide a direct test of the role of social preferences in voluntary cooperation. We elicit 
individuals’ cooperation preference in one experiment and make a point prediction about the 
contribution to a repeated public good. This allows for a novel test as to whether there are 
"types" of players who behave consistently with their elicited preferences. We find clear-cut 
evidence for the existence of "types". People who express free rider preferences show the 
most systematic deviation from the predicted contributions, because they contribute in the 
first half of the experiment. We also show that the interaction of heterogeneous types explains 
a large part of the dynamics of free riding.   
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I. Introduction 
Numerous public goods experiments have shown that many people contribute more to the 
public good than pure self-interest can easily explain. However, an equally important 
observation is that free riding becomes paramount in repeated public goods experiments 
(Ledyard 1995).  
Explanations of these findings differ in the weight they attach to “social preferences” or 
“confusion” and “trial-and-error learning”. One explanation is that the experimental situation 
triggers some cues (“social norms” or “heuristics”), which induce inexperienced subjects to 
make positive contributions initially. Over time, however, subjects become less confused and 
learn what their best strategy is and free riding – or some minimal contributions due to “warm 
glow”, “altruism”, or some other-regarding motives – prevail (e.g., Palfrey and Prisbrey 1996; 
1997; Houser and Kurzban 2002; Binmore, forthcoming). By contrast, others argue that social 
preferences must play an important role in explaining cooperation, some confusion 
notwithstanding (e.g., Andreoni 1995; Keser and van Winden 2000; Brandts and Schram 
2001; Croson 2002; Ashley, Ball and Eckel 2005). However, these latter studies only 
indirectly come to the conclusion that social preferences matter in voluntary contribution 
games, i.e., by observing data patterns that are apparently inconsistent with income-
maximizing behavior and confusion.1   
In this paper we provide a direct test of the role of social preferences in voluntary 
contribution games. Our direct test involves measuring people’s cooperation preferences in 
one public good environment and making point predictions about behavior in other 
comparable public good games. Such a direct test is important in our view when one wants to 
assess the relevance of social preferences for voluntary contributions.  
Our direct test consists of two main steps which constitute our two contributions to the 
literature. Our first contribution is to test whether there are “types” of players in the sense that 
people’s expressed cooperation preferences and actual cooperation behavior are consistent in 
the following sense: a person expressing the preference for free riding will opt for a free ride 
in various social dilemma situations where this is in his or her self-interest, while a person 
with a preference for conditional cooperation will cooperate conditionally in response to 
others' contributions in comparable public goods situations. To our knowledge, not much is 
                                                 
1 We will discuss all studies mentioned in this paragraph in more detail in Section IV.  
 2
known about the consistency of expressed preferences and actual behavior in different 
games.2  
Our second contribution is to quantify the extent to which the typically observed decay in 
contributions is the result of the interaction of different types of players. The argument which 
we will test is as follows. If people differ systematically in their contribution preferences and 
their contribution behavior is consistent with their expressed preferences, then conditional 
cooperators might start out contributing to the public good but will eventually realize that they 
get “suckered” by the free riders and will then reduce their contributions to prevent being 
duped. Thus, contributions to the public good unravel. Notice that this argument contrasts 
with the trial-and-error learning argument which has no role for social preferences.  
The environment of our study is the standard linear public good game. We conduct two 
different experiments. In the first (which we call the P-experiment), we measure people’s 
preferences toward voluntary contributions in an incentive-compatible way. The P-experiment 
is a one-shot game to avoid contamination with strategic incentives. Our instrument is a 
variant of the strategy method that uses the same strategy set as the standard public good 
game. The main concept behind the P-experiment is to ask subjects how much they will 
contribute to the public good conditional on each of the other group members' possible 
average contribution (rounded to integers). In the second experiment (the C-experiment), 
people actually contribute to a public good with random matching (repeated ten times). We 
also elicit subjects’ beliefs about other group members’ contributions in the C-experiment. 
This allows us (i) to assess the relationship between one’s own contribution and the expected 
contributions of others and (ii) to make a point prediction how much this individual will 
contribute in the C-experiment, given his or her expressed preferences in the P-experiment 
and stated beliefs in the C-experiment. Our design permits us to assess consistency of 
expressed preferences and behavior because we elicit people’s preferences and observe the 
                                                 
2 Some previous studies combined questionnaires and experiments or observed people across different games. 
For instance, Ashraf, Bohnet and Piankov (2004) observe people in trust and dictator games. In the context of 
public goods provision, Offerman, Sonnemans and Schram (1996), Park (2000) and van Dijk, Sonnemans and 
van Winden (2002) elicit social value orientations and compare them to behavior in public good environments. 
They find that the social value orientation is positively correlated with contributions to public goods. Brandts 
and Schram (2001) use questionnaires to classify people as free riders and cooperators. Carpenter and Seki 
(2005) observe fishermen in laboratory experiments and in their daily activities and find that social preferences 
as measured in the experiments and fishing productivity are positively linked. Benz and Meier (2005) observe 
subjects’ donation decisions in the laboratory and of the same persons in a naturally-occurring environment. 
However, all these studies do not make point predictions about behavior, which is what we do.  
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same person in another comparable environment. Our design will also allow us to see whether 
there are systematic deviations from predicted contributions which are specific to preference-
type.  
Our results confirm the important role of social preferences in voluntary cooperation. 
First, roughly half of our subjects are conditional cooperators and a quarter of the subjects are 
free riders. The rest shows more complicated patterns. Interestingly, subjects who experienced 
the C-experiment before we elicited their preferences in the P-experiment express on average 
the same preferences as do inexperienced subjects whose preferences we elicited before they 
played the C-experiment. We see this as supporting evidence for our interpretation of the P-
experiment as a measurement of cooperation preferences. Second, we find clear-cut evidence 
for the existence of types. People classified as conditional cooperators in the P-experiment 
also behave as conditional cooperators in the C-experiment. People classified as free riders 
contribute significantly less than do all others. Quite surprisingly, however, some of them did 
contribute to the public good in the contribution game, but basically only in the first half of 
the experiment. Third, we show with the help of the elicited preferences from the P-
experiment and the beliefs from the C-experiment that the often observed decay in 
cooperation is indeed to a very large extent due to the interaction of heterogeneously 
motivated types of players. Thus, trial-and-error learning and reduced confusion are not the 
sole reasons why cooperation collapses. The decay in contributions results from learning 
about how others behave and the players’ social preferences which determine the players’ 
response to the observed behavior of other players. We also find that consistency between 
expressed cooperation preferences and actual contributions increases over time. 
Our paper is structured as follows. We describe our design in Section II and the results in 
Section III. We discuss our contribution with respect to the related literature in Section IV. 
We believe that our results also have interesting implications for theory and policy, and 
discuss them briefly in our concluding Section V.     
 
 
II. Design and procedures  
Recall that we want to (i) measure subjects’ cooperative preferences, (ii) use these 
preferences to predict a subject’s contribution to a public good, and (iii) assess the role of 
preference interaction in explaining the decay of cooperation. To achieve our goals, the main 
novel feature of our experimental design is a combination of two different but comparable 
experiments. Table 1 provides an overview of our experimental design.  
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The first type of experiment (the "P-experiment") applies a variant of the strategy method 
to elicit people’s contribution preferences in a public goods game. By contrast, subjects in the 
second type of experiment actually make contribution choices in a standard linear public 
goods environment (labeled "C-experiment") for ten rounds in the random matching mode 
(“Strangers” – see Andreoni 1988). All subjects play both types of experiments, but not in the 
same sequence. For example, subjects first go through the preference elicitation experiment in 
the P-C sessions before making their contribution choices in an ordinary linear public goods 
game. Our C-P sessions counterbalance the order of experiments to control for possible 
sequence effects. The C-P sequence allows for a particularly strong test of measured 
preferences because people experience ten rounds of decisions in the C-experiment before 
their cooperation preferences are elicited in the P-experiment. 
 
Table 1: Design overview 
1st experiment 2nd experiment 
P-C sessions Preference elicitation (P) (strategy method) 
Ten rounds of linear public good with 
random matching (C)  
(Actual contribution choices) 
C-P sessions Ten rounds of linear public good with random matching (C)  
(Actual contribution choices) 
Preference elicitation (P) 
(strategy method)  
 
 
We now describe the two experiments in detail. We start with the P-experiments. Our 
preference elicitation study intends to directly elicit subjects’ willingness for conditional 
cooperation. To what degree are subjects willing to cooperate given other subjects’ degrees of 
cooperation? Being able to observe contribution preferences without using deception requires 
observing contributions that can be contingent on others’ contributions. Fischbacher, Gächter 
and Fehr 2001 (henceforth FGF) introduced an experimental design that accomplishes this 
task.3  The central idea of FGF is to apply a variant of the so-called “strategy method” (Selten 
1967). The subjects’ main task in the experiment is to indicate how much they want to 
contribute to the public good for each average contribution level of other group members. 
Before we describe how exactly this is done, we first outline the basic decision situation. 
                                                 
3 The FGF paper is a methodological contribution that was evaluated with a rather small number of subjects 
(n=44). We adopt the FGF method here and use it with our n=140 subjects. Ockenfels (1999) developed a 
similar design independently of FGF. Other researchers follow similar goals but devised other instruments; we 
discuss them in Section IV.  
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The basic decision situation is a standard linear public goods game (Ledyard 1995). The 
subjects are randomly assigned to groups of four people. Each subject is endowed with 20 
tokens, which she can either keep for herself or contribute to a "project", the public good. The 
payoff function is given as  
    ∑
=
+−=
4
1
4.020
j
jii ggπ ,    (1) 
where the public good is equal to the sum of the contributions of all group members. 
Contributing a token to the public good yields a private marginal return of 0.4 and the social 
benefit is 1.6. Standard assumptions therefore predict that all subjects free ride completely, 
i.e., gj = 0 for all j.  
The public good problem was explained to the subjects in the instructions (see Appendix 
A). Since we want to measure subjects’ preferences as accurately as possible, we also took 
great care to ensure that they understood both the rules of the game and the incentives. 
Therefore, after subjects had read the instructions, they had to answer ten control questions. 
The questions tested their understanding of the comparative statics properties of (1), to ensure 
that subjects are aware of their selfish incentives and the dilemma situation. We did not 
proceed until all subjects had answered all questions correctly. We can thus safely assume 
that people understood the game. 
Subjects in the P-experiment were asked to make two types of contribution decisions, one 
as a so-called "unconditional contribution", and the other by filling in a "contribution table".  
Subjects only had to make a single decision on a particular contribution to the public good in 
the "unconditional contribution" (i.e., they had to choose a number between 0 and 20), while 
they had to indicate their contribution dependent on the average contribution of the other three 
group members (rounded to integers) in the contribution table. Specifically, subjects were 
shown a table of the 21 possible values of the average contribution of the other group 
members (from 0 to 20) and were asked to state their corresponding contribution for each of 
the 21 possibilities. Subjects were under no time pressure when they made their decision.  
After the subjects had made their unconditional and conditional contribution decisions, we 
asked them on a new screen to estimate the average of the unconditional contributions of their 
three other group members. We gave the subjects financial incentives for correct estimates.4  
                                                 
4 If their estimation was exactly right, subjects received 3 experimental money units in addition to their other 
experimental earnings. They received 2 (1) additional money units if their estimation deviated by 1 (2) point(s) 
from the other group members' actual average contribution, and no additional money if their estimation was off 
the actual contribution by more than three points. 
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After all subjects had made all entries, including the estimate, a throw of a die selected 
one subject of the group, with each subject having the same probability of being chosen. The 
subjects who were not selected contributed their unconditional contributions, while the 
selected subject contributed in accordance with his or her contribution table, based on the 
unselected subjects' average contributions. This random device made both decisions 
potentially outcome relevant. Hence, subjects had an incentive to take both decisions 
seriously.5  
What are the incentives in the P-experiment? It helps to think of our experiment in terms 
of the following extensive form game played with the strategy method: nature chooses three 
players who make their contribution decisions simultaneously. The fourth player learns the 
(rounded) average contribution of the other players and then decides how much to contribute. 
Since we play this game in the strategy method, all subjects have to make contribution 
decisions in the role of the fourth player, which is what they do when they fill in the 
contribution table. All players learn whether they actually are the fourth player or not. If they 
are not chosen to be the fourth player, however, they do not learn who is chosen. The 
following prediction applies for rational and selfish players: it is optimal for the fourth player 
to contribute zero – independent of the contributions of the other players. Thus, rational and 
selfish players should only show "0" entries in their contribution tables under the strategy 
method. Assuming common knowledge of rationality and selfishness, the players who have to 
make simultaneous contribution decisions will also contribute zero to the public good. If we 
lift the assumption of common knowledge of rationality, however, the latter prediction no 
longer necessarily holds. If players assume that a "fourth player" is a "conditional cooperator" 
who displays a pattern of increasing contributions in her schedule, then a "non-zero" 
unconditional contribution may be optimal. However, only rationality and selfishness are 
assumed for the prediction of the conditional contribution. We are only interested in the 
contribution schedule and not in the unconditional contribution in this paper.  
                                                 
5  An example illustrates this mechanism. Assume that the four group members make an unconditional 
contribution of 4, 6, 8, and 10 tokens, respectively. Assume that the random device determines that the 
contribution table becomes the payoff-relevant decision for the fourth subject, whose unconditional contribution 
is 10 tokens, while the unconditional contributions are relevant for the other three group members. Hence, the 
average of their unconditional contribution is six tokens. Assume that the contribution table of the fourth subject 
says that she will contribute 5 tokens in case the others contribute 6 tokens, then her contribution to the public 
good was taken to be five tokens. Thus, the sum of contributions in this example is 23 tokens. Individual payoffs 
can now be calculated according to payoff function (1).   
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The experiment was only played once, i.e., there were no repetitions and the subjects 
knew this. The rationale is that we wanted to elicit subjects’ preferences, without 
intermingling preferences with strategic considerations. For example, if a subject chooses a 
contribution table that is increasing in the average contribution of others in the P-experiment, 
this choice cannot be due to reputation formation or any kind of repeated game consideration. 
Instead, we can take it as an unambiguous measure of the subject’s willingness to be 
conditionally cooperative. Since we identify the "type" of a subject with his or her preference, 
the P-experiments will allow us to classify our subjects into types and see how consistently 
they behave across the two games.  
Subjects in the P-C sessions were informed after finishing the P-experiment that they 
would play another experiment (at the time they revealed their preferences in the P-
experiment they did not know about a further experiment). Subjects were then told that the 
second experiment (the C-experiment) simply involved playing the basic decision situation 
ten times, where each group member simultaneously makes his or her contribution choice. 
We emphasized that the groups of four would be randomly reshuffled in each period. In 
addition to their contribution decisions, subjects also had to indicate their beliefs about the 
average contribution of the other three group members in the current period. In addition to 
their earnings from the public good experiment, we also paid subjects based on the accuracy 
of their estimates. Incentives were the same in each period as in the P-experiment.  
We elicited beliefs for two reasons. First, we can assess the correlation between beliefs 
and contributions, which we expect to differ between types of players. For instance, free 
riders are expected to have a zero correlation between their beliefs about what others 
contribute and their own contribution (which is predicted to be zero). In contrast, conditional 
cooperators are expected to have a positive correlation of beliefs and contributions. Second, 
as we will explain in detail below, we can use the beliefs and the elicited schedules from the 
P-experiment to make point predictions about an individual’s contributions in the C-
experiment.   
The sequence of experiments was simply reversed in the C-P sessions. Subjects first 
played ten rounds of the C-experiment in the random matching mode and were then 
introduced to the P-experiments. The comparison of results from the P-experiments in the C-P 
sequence with those of the P-C sequence allow us to assess the relevance of experience with 
the public goods game for elicited cooperation preferences.  
All experiments were computerized, using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999). The 
experiments were conducted in the computer lab of the University of Zurich. Our participants 
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were undergraduates from various disciplines (except economics) from the University of 
Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich. We conducted six 
sessions (three in the P-C sequence and three in the C-P sequence). In five sessions we each 
had 24 subjects and in one 20 subjects. A post-experimental questionnaire confirmed that 
participants were largely unacquainted with one another. Our 140 subjects were randomly 
allocated to the cubicles in each session, where they took their decisions in complete 
anonymity from the other subjects. On average, subjects earned 35 Swiss Francs (roughly 
$30, including a show-up fee of 10 Swiss Francs). Each session lasted roughly 90 minutes.  
 
 
III. Results 
The relationship between elicited contribution preferences in the P-experiment and actual 
cooperation behavior in the C-experiment is the center of our analysis. We therefore organize 
the presentation of our results as follows. We start our analysis by investigating how 
expressed cooperation preferences and actual contributions are related at the aggregate level. 
Our second step is to disaggregate cooperation preferences and to investigate the degree of 
heterogeneity existing in our subject pool. We then turn to a description of actual cooperation 
behavior in our third step. The fourth step relates actual cooperation behavior to the expressed 
preferences at a disaggregate level. Our final step will investigate the dynamics of free riding 
as a function of heterogeneous preferences.  
 
A. Expressed cooperation preferences and actual contributions at the aggregate level 
Fig. 1 illustrates our first main result.6 On average, we find that contributions increase in 
the other group members’ contributions. This is true for both the P-experiment, which elicits 
contribution preferences as a function of other group members’ contributions, and the C-
experiment, where we observe actual contributions (over all ten periods) as a function of the 
belief about others’ contributions. In other words, people are on average "conditional 
cooperators" who (i) express a preference for contributing more the more others’ contribute in 
the P-experiment and (ii) who actually contribute more the more they believe others 
contribute in the C-experiment. Strikingly, we also find that mean contributions in the P-
experiment and the C-experiment are almost identical. This holds in particular in the range of 
                                                 
6 Since beliefs above 11 occur in less than 10 percent of the cases, we summarizes these observation in a 
category “>11”. 
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beliefs up to seven tokens, which comprises two-thirds of all observations. For beliefs above 
seven tokens, actual contributions exceed the expressed contribution preferences. 
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Fig. 1: Expressed contribution preferences (P-experiment) and actual contributions (C-experiment). 
 
We summarize these findings in our first main result.  
 
Result 1: On average, people are conditional cooperators who contribute more the more 
they believe others contribute. Expressed contribution preferences and actual contribution 
behavior coincide in the empirically relevant range of beliefs.  
 
The significance of Result 1 is two-fold in our view. First, expressed contribution 
preferences and actual contribution behavior are on average largely consistent with one 
another. This has not yet been shown before to our knowledge. Result 1 provides a good 
starting point for our analysis of whether there are "types" of players who behave consistently 
with their expressed preferences. Later in the paper, we will show that Result 1 is not just an 
artifact of aggregation but reflects real consistency. Second, Result 1 provides support on a 
methodological level for the strategy method, which we used to elicit cooperation preferences. 
The strategy method may be criticized as being psychologically unrealistic since research 
suggests that a so-called "hot-cold empathy gap" exists in many decisions (see Loewenstein 
2000, for example). Decisions may depend on whether they are made in a "cold" state, as in 
our P-experiments, where subjects have to think about what they do if others contributed a 
certain amount, or whether they are, as in the C-experiments, actually confronted with 
contributions that others in fact made in the previous period (the "hot" situation). Result 1 
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suggests that no "hot-cold empathy gap" exists on average in our context (see Muller, Sefton, 
Steinberg and Vesterlund 2005 for a similar finding in a related experiment). 7 
In the remainder of the paper, we investigate the relationship between expressed 
preferences and actual behavior in detail. Our next step in the analysis is to look at the 
distribution of cooperation preferences.  
 
B. Heterogeneous preferences 
Recall that we have a complete contribution schedule from each subject that indicates how 
much he or she is prepared to contribute as a function of others’ contribution. A first simple 
way of characterizing heterogeneity is to look at the slope (of a linear regression) of the 
schedule and the mean contribution in the schedule. For instance, a free rider’s schedule 
consists of zero contributions for all contribution levels of other group members. Therefore, 
his slope and mean contribution are zero. An unconditional cooperator, who contributes 20 
tokens for all others’ contribution levels, has a mean contribution of 20 and a slope of zero. A 
perfect conditional cooperator, who contributes exactly the amount others contribute, has a 
slope of one and a mean contribution of 10 tokens. Fig. 2 depicts the results separately for the 
C-P and the P-C experiments. The x-axis shows the slope of the schedules and the y-axis the 
average contribution in the schedule. The dots in Fig. 2 correspond to individual observations, 
and the size of a dot to the number of observations it represents. 
Fig. 2 conveys two main messages. First, there is a large degree of heterogeneity. Free 
riders (located at 0-0) and perfect conditional cooperators (at 1-10) are relatively the largest 
group of subjects. We also find a few subjects who contribute an unconditional positive 
amount (along the y-axis, at x=0). A large number of subjects has a positive mean 
contribution and a positive slope; a few subjects have a negatively-sloped schedule (i.e., they 
contribute more the less others contribute). Second, the distribution between the C-P and the 
P-C sessions is very similar. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests do not allow rejecting the null 
hypotheses that both means and slopes are equally distributed between the treatments 
(p>0.6).8 Thus, elicitation of preferences before subjects actually experienced contributions to 
                                                 
7  The evidence on the hot-cold empathy gap in strategy method experiments and actual game-playing 
experiments is mixed. For instance, Brandts and Charness (2000) find no difference, whereas Brosig, Weimann 
and Yang (2003) report differences between methods.  
8 In Fig. 2 we looked at slope and mean contribution of a subject’s schedule. However, qualitatively, we get very 
similar results if we look at Spearman rank order correlation coefficients, linear correlation coefficients, and 
slopes and intercepts of linear regressions. In all cases p-values of Mann-Whitney tests that compare the C-P and 
the P-C experiments yield p>0.275.  
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the public good (in the P-C sessions) or after (in the C-P sessions) did not affect the elicited 
preferences. We see this as a first robustness check.  
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Fig. 2. Heterogeneous contribution preferences: Dots show observations of an individual’s slope of a linear 
regression (x-axis) and mean contribution of his or her schedule in the P-experiment. Filled (open) dots 
correspond to the P-experiment in the P-C (C-P) sessions. The size of dots corresponds to the number of 
observations.  
 
For expositional ease, it is also helpful to group subjects with similar patterns. The precise 
rules for this classification follow FGF and are as follows: All subjects who show either a 
monotonic pattern with at least one increase or have a positive Spearman rank correlation that 
is significant at the 1%-level are classified as "conditional cooperators". All subjects who 
choose to contribute 0 in any case are classified as "free riders". We designate subjects who 
have a significantly increasing scheme up to some maximum and a significantly decreasing 
scheme thereafter as "triangle contributors", again using the Spearman rank test at the 1% 
level as the criterion (FGF call this pattern "hump-shaped contributions"). All subjects who 
cannot be classified this way fall into the category "others".9 We find that the distribution of 
preference types is the same across all six independent sessions (χ2-test, p=0.510). We 
therefore pool the data from all sessions. Fig. 3 depicts – separately for each preference type – 
the mean contributions as a function of the average contribution level of other group 
members. Table 2 summarizes the results of the classification into preference types separately 
for the two sequences. 
                                                 
9 The category "others" contains two "unconditional cooperators" who always contribute 20 and one "negatively 
conditional cooperator". We include them in the category "others" in order to focus our analysis on the major 
groups we classified. 
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A first robustness test is a comparison with FGF. As a comparison of columns “pooled” 
and “FGF” shows, we replicate FGF’s results quite closely. A χ2-test cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of an equal distribution of types (p=0.729). This also holds for all separate pair-
wise Fisher exact tests (see last column, where all p-values > 0.4).   
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Fig. 3. Average own contribution level for each average contribution level of other group members 
(diagonal = perfect conditional cooperator). 
 
Subjects only played the P-experiment in FGF. A novel advantage of the present design is 
that we can test the impact of experience with a C-experiment (in the C-P sessions) on elicited 
preferences by comparing the C-P and the P-C sessions. We find that the relative sequential 
order of the P-experiment does not affect the distribution of types under P-C and C-P, 
respectively (χ2-test; p=0.481). Pair-wise Fisher exact tests, performed separately for each 
preference type, all return p-values > 0.30, i.e., the null hypothesis of an equal distribution of 
types under C-P and P-C cannot be rejected (see penultimate column). This is an important 
finding for our interpretation that the P-experiment elicits cooperation preferences. It shows 
that subjects in the C-P sessions who have experienced actual contribution behavior do not 
express different cooperation preferences than do subjects in the P-C sessions who are 
inexperienced in actual game playing when they express their preferences.  Apparently, our P-
experiment, even in the P-C sessions, allowed our subjects immediate access to their 
cooperation preferences. This finding suggests that our subjects did not need the experience of 
the C-experiment to discover their preferences (as argued by the “discovered preference 
hypothesis” (Plott 1996, see also Cooper and Kraker Stockman 2003)). Likewise, the 
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argument that one-shot environments like our P-experiment do not allow for sufficient 
learning for eliciting meaningful responses (for instance, Binmore, forthcoming) does not 
apply to our experiments.  
 
Table 2: Classifying expressed preferences (percentages)  
 Our experiments FGF p-values of pair-wise  
Fisher exact tests 
 P-C  
(n=72) 
C-P  
(n = 68) 
Pooled 
(n=140) 
 
(n=44) 
P-C vs. C-P Pooled vs. FGF
Conditional Cooperator 56.9  52.9 55.0 50.0 0.734 0.772 
Free Rider 19.4 26.5 22.9 29.6 0.421 0.419 
Triangle Contributor 15.3 8.8 12.1 13.6 0.305 0.512 
Other 8.3 11.8 10.0 6.8 0.579 0.686 
Note: For the exact definition of types see the main text.  
 
We summarize our findings in our second main result. 
 
Result 2: We find a considerable degree of heterogeneity in people’s contribution 
preferences. An absolute majority of 55 percent of people are "conditional cooperators"; 22.9 
percent are "free riders", and the rest show more complicated patterns. The distribution of 
preferences is stable between the C-P and the P-C sessions.  
 
Result 2 is consistent with existing experimental evidence and recent theories of social 
preferences which also suggest that people differ in these preferences (see, e.g., Camerer 
2003, Chap. 2, for an overview of results in experimental economics, and Kelley and 
Stahelski 1970, for a psychological approach). We conclude from Result 2 that our 
measurement of preferences is robust and therefore provides a sound basis for investigating 
behavior in the C-experiments, to which we turn next.  
 
C. Heterogeneous contribution behavior 
The aggregate results are strongly consistent with previous evidence (e.g., Isaac, Walker 
and Thomas 1984; Andreoni 1988; Weimann 1994; Laury, Walker and Williams 1995; 
Croson 1996, 2002; Keser and van Winden 2000; Fehr and Gächter 2000). Temporal patterns 
and mean contributions in the C-experiments are very similar in the C-P and the P-C sessions 
(5.2 and 4.5 tokens, respectively). Contributions start between 7 and 9 tokens and decline 
smoothly and almost identically to an average contribution of two tokens. Beliefs about 
others’ average contribution also decline steadily from 9.8 tokens in period 1 to 3.3 tokens in 
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period 10. We will look at the temporal development of contributions in detail in subsection 
III.E. We now concentrate on heterogeneous contribution behavior.  
Figure 4 shows a scatter plot of individual slopes of linear regressions of contributions on 
beliefs on the x-axis and average contributions in the C-experiment on the y-axis. The dot size 
corresponds to the number of observations. Thus, the construction of Fig. 4 is similar to Fig. 
2, which looks at heterogeneous contribution preferences.  
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Fig. 4. Heterogeneous contribution behavior: Dots show observations of an individual’s slope of a linear 
regression (x-axis) of contributiont on belieft and mean contribution over all periods t in the C-experiment. Filled 
(open) dots correspond to the C-experiment in the P-C (C-P) sessions. The size of dots corresponds to the 
number of observations.  
 
As in Fig. 2, we distinguish between the C-P and the P-C sessions. We find no sequence 
effect, neither with respect to average contributions nor with respect to slopes (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests, p > 0.27). Thus, there is no sequence effect in our data and we will therefore 
pool the sequences for the rest of our analysis. 
Fig. 4 reveals considerable heterogeneity in contribution behavior. Individual average 
contributions (depicted on the y-axis) vary between 0 and 20, although most subjects 
contribute less than ten tokens on average. Twelve percent of all subjects contribute exactly 
zero in all ten periods. The figure also shows that the strength of conditional cooperation (as 
measured by the slope) and average contributions are positively correlated. We also find that 
the individual estimated slopes of the schedules from the P-experiment (see Fig. 2) and the 
slopes of individual linear contribution-belief regressions in the C-experiments (Fig. 4) are 
highly significantly positively correlated (Spearman’s ρ=0.39, p=0.0000). We interpret this as 
a first piece of evidence that expressed cooperation preferences and actual cooperation 
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behavior are not only correlated at the aggregate level (see Result 1) but also at the individual 
level. We turn to a systematic investigation of this issue in the following subsection.  
 
D. Consistency of preferences and contribution behavior  
The next, and indeed central, step in our analysis concerns the contribution behavior of the 
different preference types in the C-experiments, given their beliefs and their elicited 
cooperation preferences in the P-experiment. A high degree of consistency of preferences and 
actual contribution behavior for the different types of preferences (not just at the aggregate 
level as shown by Result 1) would support the hypothesis that there are indeed "types" of 
players who behave consistently across different but comparable games.  
We begin this analysis with a preliminary observation on first-period beliefs. We 
investigate whether the different preference types hold different first-period beliefs. First-
period beliefs are particularly interesting because they express a subject's intuitive estimate of 
how others will behave before a subject actually has made any observation about others’ 
behavior. One hypothesis we examine comes from the "false consensus effect" and the 
observation, made by psychologists (e.g., Kelley and Stahelski 1970), that people have a 
tendency to believe that others behave similarly to themselves. If this were the case, we 
should observe that free riders hold consistently lower beliefs than do conditional cooperators, 
for example. An alternative hypothesis is that people may differ in their perceptions but, since 
our subjects had an incentive to estimate their group members’ contribution correctly, we 
predict that there should be no difference in beliefs between preference types. The results 
reject the hypothesis of a "false consensus effect" (see also Engelmann and Strobel 2000) and 
favor the alternative hypothesis that there are no systematic differences in first-period beliefs 
between preference types (Kruskal-Wallis test, p=0.4531).  
We now look at the contribution behavior of the different preference types. We find that 
contributions already differ strongly between types in the first period (Kruskal-Wallis test, 
p=0.0134). Free riders start out with much lower contributions (less than 5 tokens) than all 
other preference types, whose starting contributions amount to roughly 9 tokens; the other 
preference types are statistically indistinguishable (Kruskal-Wallis test, p=0.8911). The 
difference in initial contributions between free riders and all other preference types is highly 
significant according to a Mann-Whitney test (p=0.0012, two-tailed). Across all periods free 
riders contribute an average of 2.5 tokens, which is less than all others. Free riders also make 
the lowest average contributions in all six sessions. Their contributions are significantly lower 
than those of the other preference types (p=0.0039, Mann-Whitney test, session averages as 
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observations). Seventy percent of all free rider contributions are exactly zero. By contrast, 
conditional cooperators contribute on average 5.6 tokens; triangle contributors spend 4.9 
tokens on the public good and "others" invest 5.7 tokens. Free riders contribute almost 
nothing to the public good in the second half of the C-experiment (periods 6-10). More than 
80 percent of them contribute exactly zero; their average contribution is 1 token. The average 
contributions of the conditional cooperators, the triangle contributors, and "others" in periods 
6-10 are 4.1, 2.2, and 5.0 tokens, respectively.  
Table 3 reports econometric support for the conclusion that the different preference types 
make different contributions to the public good. The dependent variable is "Contribution in 
period t" and the explanatory variables are (i) dummies for the different preference types 
(with free riders providing the reference group) and (ii) the belief about others’ average 
contribution in period t.  
 
Table 3: Mean contributions of the different preference types (Tobit estimates) 
 
(1) 
All periods
(2) 
Periods 1-5
(3) 
Periods 6-10
(4) 
Period 1 
(5) 
Period 10 
Belief 1.149 1.084 1.154 1.292 1.224 
 (0.115)*** (0.143)*** (0.163)*** (0.159)*** (0.355)*** 
Conditional Cooperator 6.281 5.293 7.455 5.759 6.788 
 (1.451)*** (1.794)*** (1.446)*** (2.102)*** (2.511)*** 
Triangle Contributor 4.747 4.985 4.673 8.083 4.523 
 (1.619)*** (2.035)** (1.566)*** (2.258)*** (2.622)* 
Others 5.900 3.982 8.005 3.746 6.841 
 (2.263)*** (2.430) (2.273)*** (3.152) (3.110)** 
Constant -9.385 -7.930 -10.346 -9.926 -10.940 
 (1.474)*** (1.819)*** (1.615)*** (2.265)*** (2.685)*** 
Observations 1400 700 700 140 140 
χ2(4) 122.80* 74.96*** 73.45*** 89.39*** 19.95*** 
Note: Tobit regression with robust standard errors (clustered on subjects). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Free Riders are the reference group. Dependent variable 
is “Contribution in period t”.  
 
This model thus measures to what extent the different types differ in their average 
contribution behavior when we control for the belief they hold. We estimate five models. The 
first model comprises all periods. The second and third models look at the first five and last 
five periods, respectively. The fourth and the fifth model investigate the beginning and the 
end of the experiment, i.e., period 1 and period 10, respectively.  
We find in all models that the higher the belief about the other group members’ 
contribution, the higher is, ceteris paribus, the own contribution. Moreover, holding beliefs 
constant, all types contribute significantly more on average than free riders (the exception are 
“others” in models (2) and (4)). Model (4) looks at period 1. Period 1 is interesting because it 
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tells us something about how contributions are determined initially, when subjects have not 
yet made any observation about others’ contributions. We find that the higher beliefs are the 
higher are initial contributions. The preference-type composition of the subject pool also 
matters: conditional cooperators and triangle contributors contribute significantly more for a 
given belief than free riders; “others” do not contribute significantly more than free riders. 
Finally, model (5) demonstrates that even in the last period subjects contribute more the 
higher their belief about others’ contribution; and, given their belief, all types contribute more 
than free riders. A further remarkable result from comparing all five models is that the 
estimated parameters are very similar. This holds in particular for “Belief”, “Conditional 
Cooperators”, and the constant. We interpret this as evidence for the stability of the 
relationship between beliefs and type-specific contributions. Given this stable relationship, 
contributions decline because on average subjects adjust their beliefs downwards as they learn 
about other subjects’ contributions. We will investigate this mechanism in detail in subsection 
III.E.  
After having established that the different preference types exhibit a different contribution 
behavior, our next step is to contrast the predicted relationship between beliefs and 
contributions with the actual contributions. Remember that we asked subjects in the P-
experiment how much they would like to contribute if the other group members contribute a 
certain amount x. A contribution in the C-experiment, given a subject’s belief x about others’ 
contribution, is consistent with the preferences in the P-experiment when a subject contributes 
the same amount he or she indicates in her schedule given others’ contribute x. Hence, on the 
basis of Fig. 3 we predict a significantly positive correlation between beliefs and contributions 
for the conditional cooperators, and no correlation for the free riders, apart from some random 
deviations. The triangle contributors should have a hump-shaped relation between their stated 
beliefs and their actual contributions. Beliefs and contributions should be unrelated for 
“others”.  
Table 4 reports the Tobit estimates of actual contributions regressed on the beliefs about 
other group members’ contribution.10 Since we predict this relationship to be hump-shaped 
for triangle contributors, we also include “Belief squared” as a regressor. We estimate this 
model separately for each type and for periods 1 – 5 and 6 – 10, respectively.  
We find that, with the exception of triangle contributors, beliefs and contributions are 
significantly correlated for all types in the first half of the experiment. This correlation 
                                                 
10  In Appendix B we document the raw data that underlie these estimations in form of a scatter plot of 
contributions on beliefs for the different preference types and for periods 1-5 and 6-10, respectively. 
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remains positive for all types in the second half, with the exception of free riders. Squared 
beliefs only matter for triangle contributors and “others” in the second half of the experiment. 
Fig. 5 plots the predicted contributions – given the stated beliefs – that follow from the 
estimation model of Table 4.11 Again we distinguish between the first and the second half of 
the experiment. We contrast the predicted contributions in the C-experiment with the 
predictions gained from the P-experiment.  
 
Table 4: The correlation between own belief and actual contribution of the different types in periods 1-5 
and 6-10, respectively (Tobit estimates). Dependent variable is actual contributions.  
 Conditional Cooperators  Free Riders 
 Period 1-5 Period 6-10  Period 1-5 Period 6-10 
Belief about others' mean contribution 0.853 1.301  3.140 1.955 
 (0.505)* (0.421)***  (1.339)** (1.799) 
Belief squared 0.014 -0.008  -0.095 -0.072 
 (0.304) (0.026)  (0.065) (0.153) 
Constant -1.851 -3.266  -19.803 -14.516 
 (2.032) (1.272)**  (7.505)*** (5.889)*** 
Observations 385 385  160 160 
      
 Triangle Contributors  Others 
 Period 1-5 Period 6-10  Period 1-5 Period 6-10 
Belief about others' mean contribution 0.244 1.779  1.607 5.697 
 (0.657) (0.472)***  (0.698)*** (1.709)*** 
Belief squared 0.035 -0.095  -0.031 -0.271 
 (0.050) (0.032)***  (0.039) (0.083)*** 
Constant 1.413 -4.393  -5.455 -16.246 
 (2.039) (1.642)***  (3.860) (6.130)*** 
Observations 85 85  70 70 
Note: Tobit regression with robust standard errors (clustered on subjects). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent variable is “Contribution in period t”.  
 
The estimated contributions for conditional cooperators, given their stated beliefs, are 
almost identical between the first and the second half of the experiment. However, the 
estimated contributions exceed the predicted contributions as derived from their expressed 
preferences in the P-experiment. We find that the estimated relationship between beliefs and 
contributions for free riders is positive but becomes much flatter in the second half of the 
                                                 
11  Specifically, we calculate the predicted contribution for each empirically observed belief using a post-
estimation command (“predict” in Stata 8.2). We average over those beliefs and plot them in Fig. 5. Since in a 
few cases we did not observe a belief (e.g., free riders never expressed a belief between 16 and 19 in the C-
experiment), there are some gaps in the predicted contributions of free riders, triangle contributors, and “others”.  
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experiment. This finding supports the argument that some cooperation by the free riders is 
(misperceived) strategic cooperation.12 
Triangle contributors and “others” have a positively increasing relationship between 
beliefs and contributions in the first half of the experiment. This relationship becomes hump-
shaped in the second half of the experiment for both types. The estimated contributions for the 
triangle contributors follow the predicted contributions from the P-experiment quite well. 
Our next step is to look at single decisions and to assess how they deviate from the 
predicted choice. Since we have each subject's schedule from the P-experiment and since we 
also have his or her beliefs in the C-experiment, we can calculate a predicted contribution that 
follows from a particular subject's schedule and compare this point prediction to his or her 
actual contribution.  
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Fig. 5. Estimated contribution (predicted values from a Tobit estimation) for a given belief in periods 1-5 (filled 
symbols) and periods 6-10 (open symbols) of the C-experiment, and predicted contributions from the P-
experiment (solid lines).  
 
                                                 
12  See also Sonnemans et al. (1999) for an analysis of strategic behavior by free riders in public goods 
experiments. 
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Fig. 6 depicts the distribution of the deviation of actual choices from predicted choices 
separately for each preference type. We also distinguish between the first and the second half 
of the experiment. We find that for all types, the modal choice equals the predicted choice, 
except for the “others”. This holds true for both halves of the experiment.  
Fig. 6 also shows that choices are closer to the predicted choice in the second half than in 
the first half of the experiment for all types (except for “others”). Free riders – for whom 
consistency is certainly easiest – make the most consistent choices of all types in the sense 
that 60 to 80 percent of their choices (between periods 1-5 and 6-10, respectively) conform 
exactly to their predicted choice. The corresponding percentage of cases is between 26 and 38 
percent (21 and 31 percent) for conditional cooperators (triangle contributors). In periods 1-5 
and 6-10, respectively, “others” exhibit consistent choices in 11 and 8 percent of the cases. 
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Fig. 6. Percent of choices that deviate from predicted choices. 
 
Insisting on a perfect coincidence of predicted and actual choices is certainly a very 
demanding criterion, in particular for the non-free riders. If we relax this criterion and call a 
subject consistent if he or she deviates at most by ±2 tokens (10 percent of the endowment), 
then consistency rates increase from 52, 63 and 54 percent in periods 1-5 to 65, 88, and 82 
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percent in periods 6-10 for conditional cooperators, free riders, and triangle contributors, 
respectively. “Others” demonstrate consistent choices in 34 and 33 percent of the cases, 
respectively. Thus, the median choice of all types is consistent with the expressed preferences 
of this type, with the exception of “others”.  
Conditional cooperators deviate rather symmetrically from their exact predicted choices. 
On average, they slightly overcontribute: they deviate by 0.73 tokens (0.76 and 0.69 for 
periods 1-5 and 6-10, respectively) from their predicted choice. Triangle contributors 
overcontribute on average by 1.81 tokens. Yet, they become considerably more consistent 
over time: their average deviation in periods 1-5 drops from 3.67 tokens to -0.06 tokens in 
periods 6-10. The free riders' overcontribution drops from 3.94 tokens in periods 1-5 to 1.04 
tokens in periods 6-10.  
Our last question concerns the consistency of individuals rather than single choices: How 
are consistent choices distributed across individuals? We call a choice consistent in this 
analysis if it deviates at most between ±2 tokens from the predicted choice. Since each 
individual plays ten rounds in the C-experiment, he or she has ten opportunities to be 
consistent. Fig. 7 plots the cumulative frequency distribution of individuals who make a 
consistent contribution in x out of 10 periods. Thus, an individual for whom x = 10 makes a 
consistent choice in ten out of ten rounds; an individual for whom x = 0 never makes a 
consistent choice. As a benchmark we also include the cumulative frequency distribution if 
people were to choose randomly.  
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Fig. 7. Distribution of individuals who behave consistently with their expressed preferences for x numbers of 
periods. 
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The results show that free riders are the most consistent people: 44 percent of them are 
consistent (i.e., free ride) in ten out of ten periods. Only relatively few conditional cooperators 
and triangle contributors (12 and 17 percent, respectively) make a consistent choice in each of 
the ten rounds. However, except for “others” (who are closest to random choice), the clear 
majority of individuals (between 55 and 77 percent) makes a consistent choice in at least six 
periods of the C-experiment. Thus, in the majority of periods the median individual behaves 
consistently with his or her expressed preferences. 
We summarize our main finding in this section in our third main result.  
 
Result 3: We find a high degree of consistency between expressed preferences and actual 
contribution behavior for all preference types, with the exception of “others”. Specifically, we 
find (i) that for a given belief free riders contribute significantly less than all others; (ii) the 
estimated relationship between beliefs and actual contribution conforms to the predicted 
relationship for all types, in particular in the second half of the experiment; (iii) the modal 
and median choices are consistent with the predicted choices; and (iv) the median individual 
behaves consistently with his or her expressed preferences in the majority of periods. The 
strongest systematic deviation from predicted choices occurs by free riders, who contribute 
strategically in the first half of the C-experiment.  
 
We see Result 3 as evidence for the existence of different “types” of economic agents, 
who are characterized by different social preferences and behave consistently across different 
situations. Our final step is to quantify to what extent the interaction of different types can 
explain the downward trend in contributions.  
 
E. Heterogeneous preferences and the dynamics of free riding 
Fig. 3 already suggests that contributions will decline over time, because the schedules of 
all types, with the exception of “others”, are consistently below the diagonal. FGF and Fehr 
and Fischbacher (2004), for instance, argue that this can in principle explain the decay in 
cooperation. The implicit assumption is that there are types of players who are consistent 
across games. Result 3 supports this assumption. However, even if there are types of players, 
this does not say anything about the actual path of contributions and the speed and asymptote 
of the decline. Thus, our goal in this subsection is to provide rigorous evidence on the role of 
heterogeneous types in explaining the decay in cooperation. 
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Since we have the schedules of all subjects, we can assess the type-interaction induced 
decay in cooperation by simulating the contribution path that would occur if all participants 
would strictly adhere to their schedules. In other words, we take the first-period contributions 
as the starting values in our simulation and let contributions evolve as determined by the 
schedules of our participants, given the exact matching structure that was in place in the C-
experiment. We use the average contribution generated in the previous period for the period-
by-period updating of simulated beliefs. Fig. 8 shows – separately for each of the six sessions 
– the resulting average contributions of this simulation, along with the average actual 
contribution paths. The simulated contributions decrease in all six sessions and largely follow 
the actual contribution paths.  
It is tempting to attribute the difference between the simulated and the actual contribution 
solely to errors. After all, the identifying assumption of the simulation is that people do not 
make any errors. The rationale of this argument is that the schedules measure people’s error-
free contribution preferences, as a function of other group members’ contributions. 13 
Therefore, if we keep the expressed preferences fixed and let them interact we get the “error-
free” contribution path. Consequently, the difference between the actual contribution path and 
the simulated path measures the extent of contributions that are due to errors. However, this is 
a premature conclusion, because it might overestimate the extent of errors. If, for instance, a 
free rider contributes more than zero, then this contribution will influence the conditional 
cooperators' beliefs, for example, about the average contribution level of the other group 
members. Since the contribution schedule of a conditional cooperator is increasing in the 
belief about what others contribute, the predicted contribution of a conditional cooperator 
increases in the free rider’s erroneous contribution. Thus, the predicted contribution of all 
types, except the free riders, is generally endogenous and, via the beliefs, influenced by both 
the contributions due to the other types’ preferences and their “errors”. The line with the open 
diamonds in Fig. 8 depicts the mean predicted contribution over time that results if we 
evaluate the schedules given the expressed beliefs.  
As we see, the predicted contribution that is endogenous to the other players' errors falls 
as well, but is closer to the actual contribution level than the simulated contribution that 
assumes errors away. The mean absolute deviation (MAD) of the simulated contributions 
                                                 
13 This interpretation is justified given the extensive training, the absence of time pressure in the P-experiment, 
and the absence of sequence effects in elicited preferences in the C-P and P-C experiments. 
 24
from the actual contributions is 1.4 tokens, whereas it is 1.1 tokens for the predicted 
contributions.14 
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Fig. 8. Mean actual, mean predicted contribution (derived from beliefs and schedules) and mean simulated 
contribution (resulting from interaction of schedules) across all types over time.  
 
The final step in our analysis concerns the development of the MAD of the predicted 
contributions from the actual contributions of the four types. Fig. 9 plots the resulting time 
series for each type and the total MAD.  
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Fig. 9. MAD of actual and predicted contribution in percent of endowment per type and period.  
                                                 
14 These figures are the averages across all periods. For the simulated contributions, we calculate MAD for each 
period except period 1, which by construction has a MAD of zero.  
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MAD clearly decreases over time, except for “others”, who start at a MAD level in excess 
of all others and which decreases over time. By contrast, the consistency of conditional 
cooperators, triangle contributors, and free riders is very similar over time; ultimately, all 
become gradually more consistent. The MAD of the free riders and the triangle contributors 
are already persistently below those of conditional cooperators after period 4. 
We now turn to an econometric analysis of the development of the MAD over time. We 
are particularly interested in estimating the starting and asymptotic values of the deviations of 
actual and predicted contributions. We estimate the following model:15 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
(1/ ) (1/ ) (1/ ) (1/ )
( 1) / ( 1) / ( 1) / ( 1) /
ijt C C F F T T O O
C C F F T T O O
AD D t D t D t D t
D t t D t t D t t D t t u
β β β β
β β β β
= + + + +
+ − + − + − + − +  
where ADijt is the absolute deviation of predicted and actual contribution in period t of 
individual i who is of type j. Dj is a dummy for type j ∈ {Conditional cooperator, Free rider, 
Triangle contributor, Others}. The coefficient j1β measures the starting value of the absolute 
deviation of type j while the coefficient j2β measures the asymptote. As t increases the weight 
of j1β gets small because 1/t goes to zero, while the weight of j2β gets large because (t – 1)/t 
approaches 1. The estimation approach is OLS. We calculate robust standard errors by 
clustering on subjects.  As a benchmark we also estimate a model where we pool the types:   
1 2(1/ ) ( 1) /itAD t t tβ β ν= + − + . 
The findings are documented in Table 5. The econometric results confirm the impression 
from Fig. 9. We start with the pooled model. The estimated initial value of AD is 25 percent 
of the endowment, which is highly significantly different from zero. Absolute deviations are 
reduced almost by half over time and approach 14.4 percent.   
When we distinguish between types, we find that both starting values and asymptotic 
values of the absolute deviations differ between types. F-tests confirm these conclusions for 
both the starting values [F(4,5)=30.53; p=0.0008] and the asymptotic values [F(4,5)=28.75; 
p=0.0000]. The goodness of fit as measured by the R2 also increases from 0.34 to 0.42. All 
types have significantly positive starting values. The absolute deviation of free riders and 
triangle contributors declines asymptotically, as 2β  for these types is an order of magnitude 
smaller than the starting values. The asymptotic absolute deviation rates are 5.3 and 7.7 
                                                 
15 The approach is inspired by Noussair, Plott and Riezman (1995, p. 473). 
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percent of the endowment, respectively. Deviations of conditional cooperators are only 
slightly (but significantly) reduced; their initial deviation rate is 18.6 percent, which declines 
modestly to an asymptotic deviation rate of 14.6 percent of the endowment. Only for “others” 
do deviation rates increase from an initial rate of 36.9 percent to an asymptotic value of 42.5 
percent. 
 
Table 5: Development of absolute deviation over time 
 
Dependent variable:  
|actual contribution – predicted contribution|  
in percent of endowment 
 
Starting value  
β1 
Asymptote 
β2 
Pooled data  
(no distinction between types) 
0.250*** 
(0.0259) 
0.144*** 
(0.0170) 
Observations 1400 
R-squared 0.34 
Distinguish between types: 
Starting value  
β1j 
Asymptote 
β2j 
   
Conditional Cooperators 0.186*** 0.146*** 
 (0.0212) (0.0188) 
Free Riders 0.298** 0.053*** 
 (0.0725) (0.0172) 
Triangle Contributors 0.349** 0.077** 
 (0.0900) (0.0153) 
Others 0.369** 0.425*** 
 (0.1032) (0.0954) 
Observations 1400 
R-squared 0.42 
Note: Robust standard errors (clustering on subjects) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
We summarize these findings in our final main result: 
 
Result 4: The interaction of heterogeneously motivated types explains a large part of the 
decay of cooperation. We also find that the consistency of expressed cooperation preferences 
and actual behavior increases over time.   
 
Result 4 together with the estimated initial contributions (model (4) of Table 3) provide an 
explanation for the observed contribution pattern in public goods experiments with random 
matching. Initial contributions are determined by the type composition of the subject pool and 
the initial beliefs subjects hold; the higher their initial beliefs are the higher are their initial 
contributions. After subjects observe others’ contributions they adapt their beliefs and 
determine their new contributions given their cooperation preferences. Experience matters in 
 27
two ways: first, subjects learn how others behave and on average adjust their beliefs 
downwards, and second, subjects become more consistent with their preferences over time.   
 
IV. Discussion and related literature 
We see our paper as a contribution to the literature on the motivations behind voluntary 
contributions. In this section, we discuss our contribution relative to some previous studies 
that share some of the goals of this paper.   
Sugden (1984) argued early on for the importance of reciprocity (“a conditional obligation 
to contribute if others contribute”) in voluntary contributions. Our first main result vindicates 
his theoretical argument by showing that people actually are conditionally cooperative on 
average. A number of studies, including FGF, have already suggested conditional cooperation 
as an important motivation in public goods experiments. For instance, Keser and van Winden 
(2000) and Ashley, Ball and Eckel (2005) find that subjects reduce their contributions when 
they find out that they have been contributing above average and (slightly) increase their 
contribution if they were below average. We find similar results in the data of our C-
experiment, and such a reaction is consistent with conditional cooperation. Tighter evidence 
for conditional cooperation comes from studies that elicit beliefs about others’ contributions 
(e.g., Croson 2000, 2002; Neugebauer, Perote, Schmidt and Loos 2005). Like our study (see 
Result 1), these papers find a positive correlation between beliefs and contributions. These 
studies, however, only examine aggregate data and draw no inferences about individual 
differences, which we find to be essential (see Result 2 and Fig. 4). More importantly, the 
problem with beliefs is that they evolve endogenously and are thus beyond the control of the 
experimenter. Moreover, a pessimistic conditional cooperator and a free rider exhibit the same 
behavior, but for different motivational reasons. Thus, the correlation between beliefs and 
contributions is only an imperfect indicator of preferences. The strategy method that we apply 
to measure preferences avoids this problem because the contributions of others are fixed by 
design.  
Several studies try to estimate heterogeneity in the population. One of the first studies to 
do this is Palfrey and Prisbrey (1996, 1997). The main idea is to assign subjects different 
marginal rates of substitution (MRS) between the public good and the private good. The MRS 
are changed from round to round. The design allows estimating individual response functions 
from which altruism, “warm glow” and confusion can be separated. Altruism (i.e., 
maximizing group payoff) does not explain behavior, whereas “warm glow” (a willingness to 
contribute a certain constant amount independently of others’ contribution – see also 
Andreoni 1990) is significant and differs between people. Considerably less that half of all 
 28
subjects show a significantly positive warm glow effect, however. Goeree, Holt and Laury 
(2002) find more evidence for altruism than for warm glow and also report considerable 
individual heterogeneity with respect to altruism. Still, the models by Palfrey and Prisbrey 
and Goeree et al. (2002) do not consider conditional cooperation, which – according to our 
Results 2 and 3 – characterizes contribution preferences and behavior of more than 50 percent 
of the subjects.  
Brandts and Schram (2001), FGF, and the present study use the strategy method to draw 
inferences about heterogeneous motivations. Brandts and Schram (2001) developed a 
“contribution function approach” which asks subjects to make contributions for ten different 
MRS. These MRS are such that they define three generic situations: (i) it is a dominant and 
efficient strategy to contribute; or (ii) it is dominated and inefficient to contribute, or (iii) it is 
efficient but dominated to contribute. The latter situation is the standard one; the former 
situations allow identifying erroneous contributions, because all preference types should 
either contribute (in situation (i)) or not (in situation (ii)). Brandts and Schram (2001) argue 
that confusion alone cannot explain their data. They categorize 40.6 percent of their subjects 
as “individualists” because according to their contribution function individualists only 
contribute in situation (i); 31.8 percent of the subjects make positive contributions in 
situations (i) and (iii) and are therefore classified as “cooperators”; the rest goes unclassified. 
The main difference between Brandts and Schram (2001) and the present study is that Brandts 
and Schram (2001) used the strategy method for different MRS, whereas the present study 
kept the MRS constant and used the strategy method to elicit how preferences depend on 
others’ contributions.  
Several recent studies tried to assess heterogeneity with different methods. Bardsley and 
Moffatt (2005) use the “conditional information lottery” to vary other’s contribution behavior 
exogenously. They find that 25 percent are free riders, 39 percent are strategists (who only 
cooperate strategically), 29 percent are reciprocators and 6 percent are altruists. Kurzban and 
Houser (2005) measure types as follows. First subjects simultaneously make initial 
contributions and are then repeatedly given the opportunity to revise their contributions for an 
unspecified (but randomly determined) number of opportunities. Subjects play several such 
rounds with varying numbers of opportunities for revising contributions. Subjects are then 
classified statistically by calculating each subject's “linear conditional-contribution profile”. 
Kurzban and Houser (2005) find 20 percent free riders, 13 percent cooperators, and 63 
percent reciprocators. Burlando and Guala (2005) use a mixture of methods to classify types: 
They use the strategy method, value orientation tests, experimental choices, and 
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questionnaires. They find 32 percent free riders, 35 percent reciprocators, 18 percent 
cooperators, and 15 percent “noisy” types. Finally, the subjects in Muller et al. (2005) play a 
two-stage public goods experiment (using a variant of the strategy method). Muller et al. 
(2005) classify 35 percent as “selfish subjects” who give nothing in the second stage 
irrespective of the first stage contribution of the other players. 38 percent are “conditional 
cooperators” who condition their second stage contribution positively on the first stage 
contribution of the other players.  
The frequency distributions of types are hardly comparable because designs differ in too 
many details. Yet, the fact that all studies find substantial heterogeneity supports one of our 
main findings, namely that there is heterogeneity in subjects’ contribution behavior. The main 
difference between approaches is that we (and Muller et al. 2005) conceptually distinguish 
between preferences and actual behavior. To do this, we developed two experiments to 
measure preferences and actual behavior separately, whereas the other approaches infer 
motivations from observing patterns of actual contributions. Kurzban and Houser (2005), for 
instance, infer types by observing how subjects revise their contributions, if given the 
opportunity. Since subjects did not know how many opportunities for revision they have, 
decisions might not only reflect preferences, but strategic behavior as well. Thus, the 
distinction between preferences and actual contributions is not as straightforward as in our 
design.  
Why do contributions in public goods experiments decline over time? Specifically, in 
addition to investigating the role of learning (e.g., Andreoni 1988; Hichri and Kirman 2004), 
research explaining the decay has evolved around the issue of separating motivations from 
mistakes. One of the first papers on this issue is Andreoni (1995). He developed a design that 
allows him to distinguish “kindness” from “confusion” and concludes that “cooperation is 
about half kindness and half confusion” (p. 898). Given this result, he explains the decline in 
cooperation “to be due to frustrated attempts at kindness, rather than learning the free-riding 
incentives” (p. 900). Our observation on the importance of conditional cooperation (Result 1 
and in particular Result 4), supports this conclusion and shows how exactly “frustrated 
attempts at kindness” lead to the decline in cooperation. Houser and Kurzban (2002) 
replicated Andreoni’s (1995) results by measuring confusion in an experiment where subjects 
play against a computer and comparing contributions to a public good with human 
contributors (for a related comprehensive experiment see Ferraro and Vossler 2005). Yet, 
Houser and Kurzban (2002) and Palfrey and Prisbrey (1996, 1997) attribute the decay in 
cooperation largely to reduced confusion. Our Result 4 certainly supports the importance of 
 30
increased consistency over time (see in particular Fig. 9 and Table 5). Learning about others’ 
behavior and preference heterogeneity, and not just reduced confusion alone, explains the 
decay in our data to a large extent, however. The experiments by Neugebauer, Perote, 
Schmidt and Loos (2005), Kurzban and Houser (2005), and Gächter and Thöni (2005) support 
this conclusion.  
First, Neugebauer et al. (2005) report the results from two treatments, one in which 
subjects are informed about others’ contributions in each round, and one in which they 
receive no information. Conditional cooperation and learning about the dominant strategy are 
possible in the first treatment, while only learning is possible in the second. The authors 
hypothesize that if learning largely explains the decay of contributions, this decay should also 
appear in the no-information treatment as well. Their results show, however, that 
contributions only decline with information but remain roughly constant in the absence of 
information. Second, Kurzban and Houser (2005) find that the type composition of a group 
predicts the actual (declining) contribution pattern rather well. Third, an implication of the 
preference heterogeneity explanation of the decay of cooperation is that conditional 
cooperators who would be among other cooperators and would know this should be able to 
maintain high contributions, i.e., be able to prevent the decay. Gächter and Thöni (2005) test 
this argument as follows. Subjects first play a one-shot experiment and are then regrouped 
according to their cooperativeness. Subjects are then informed about this regrouping and told 
that they will play the public goods game for ten rounds with the same new people. Gächter 
and Thöni (2005) find that cooperative subjects who know that they are among other “like-
minded” cooperators indeed cooperate at almost the efficient level and without any substantial 
decay.16    
A final issue concerns the stability of preferences. We measured the preferences only once 
in our P-experiment. This raises the issue of whether preferences would be stable against 
repeated measurement. Muller et al. (2005) address a similar issue in their two-stage 
experiment, in which subjects play against five different opponents. Muller et al. find that the 
distribution of strategies is stable but about 28 percent of their subjects change the type of 
strategy from period to period. It is an open question whether the same kind of instability 
occurs also in an experiment in which preferences are elicited as in our P-experiment. 
 
                                                 
16 See Gunnthorsdottir, Houser, McCabe and Ameden (2001) for an early related experiment and Ones and 
Putterman (2004) for a more comprehensive discussion of group composition effects.  
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V. Summary and conclusions 
Our goal in this study was to provide a direct test of the role of social preferences in 
voluntary cooperation. We achieved this by eliciting preferences in one specially-designed 
game (the “P-experiment”) and predicting behavior in ten standard public goods games with 
random matching (the “C-experiments”). Our most important results are as follows: 
First, consistent with previous evidence, we find a high degree of heterogeneity in 
people’s cooperation preferences as well as actual contributions. Our novel finding is that 
there are “types” of players in the sense that expressed cooperation preferences (as elicited in 
the P-experiments) and actual contributions (as observed in the C-experiments) are largely 
consistent with each other. This holds in particular for conditional cooperators. Free riders 
(and triangle contributors) show the most systematic deviation from their expressed 
cooperation preferences in the first half of the C-experiment, which is likely due to a 
(misplaced) strategic attempt to induce others to contribute more. Actual contributions are 
strongly consistent with predicted contributions in the second half of the C-experiment.  
Second, the interaction between heterogeneously motivated types explains the decay often 
observed in contributions to the public good. This effect is quantitatively important and 
vindicates previous speculative arguments by FGF and Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) that 
cooperation is fragile due to preference heterogeneity.  
We see our result, namely that there are types of players who are consistent across 
different but related games, as a first step in understanding heterogeneous motivations. Our 
research strategy was to make the P-experiments and the C-experiments comparable. This 
feature allowed us to make point predictions about how a consistent individual (“a type”) 
should behave; any other design would have made the consistency check more ambiguous. 
Moreover, consistency between closely related but different games is a necessary first step to 
take if one wants to establish the existence of types of players; if we had found largely 
inconsistent behavior between comparable games, then the existence of types of players 
would have been in doubt from the start. The broader methodological importance of this 
result is that one can measure social preferences in one game and predict behavior in other 
games.    
We believe that our findings have significance for theoretical and policy issues. Take the 
theoretical reasons first. Our finding of a high degree of consistency of preferences and 
behavior is relevant for the interpretation of recent theories of social preferences (see Sobel 
2005 for a recent comprehensive overview). These theories also allow for heterogeneous 
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preferences but assume that the relevant preference parameters for a given individual are fixed 
across games. Result 3 supports this crucial assumption.  
Second, the results support modeling assumptions that assume different types of players in 
an incomplete information game. Our findings suggest that, for practical modeling purposes, a 
concentration on two sorts of types – the free riders and the conditional cooperators, suffices 
because triangle contributors are very similar to conditional cooperators in the relevant range 
of actual contributions (and therefore beliefs). Even “others” behave conditionally 
cooperatively in the C-experiments (compare Fig. 5).  
Third, Result 4 reinforces the theoretical prediction by recent models of social preferences 
that in the absence of punishment opportunities (see, e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2000; Masclet et 
al. 2003; Carpenter, forthcoming), the co-existence of heterogeneously motivated agents will 
lead to almost universal free riding behavior. This holds despite the fact that a majority of 
people is not motivated by selfishness. We think this result is important in view of arguments 
that deviations from income-maximizing Nash-equilibria are largely due to inexperience and 
lack of trial-and-error learning. Binmore (forthcoming) makes this viewpoint very clear in a 
recent comment on social preference explanations of experimental results:  
“… There is a huge literature which shows that adequately rewarded laboratory subjects learn to play 
income-maximizing Nash equilibria in a wide variety of games – provided they have gained sufficient 
experience of the game and the way that other subjects play”.   
After Binmore has cited the standard result of eventual free riding in repeated public 
goods experiments in support of the above argument he argues:  
“I emphasize the standard results in Public Goods games because the orthodox view among mainstream 
economists and game theorists (…) is not that the learning or trial-and-error adjustment that might take 
place during repeated play (against a new opponent each time) is a secondary phenomenon to which 
conclusions may or may not be sensitive. On the contrary, the fact that laboratory subjects commonly 
adapt their behavior to the game they are playing as they gain experience is entirely central to our 
position.” 
Our results from the P-experiment and the C-experiment, which separate preferences and 
behavior, uncover how experience in the public goods game matters. First, experience matters 
in the sense that over time contributions become more consistent with expressed preferences 
for all types (except “others”). Second, experience about others rather than just the game itself 
matters in particular for conditional cooperators and triangle contributors. These types make 
their contributions contingent on what they believe others will do; this holds even in the final 
period of the C-experiment. Since experience tells the non-free rider types that there are free 
riders types who behave by and large in a selfish income-maximizing way, the non-free rider 
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types adjust their contributions accordingly. Thus, deviations from the income-maximizing 
Nash equilibrium are not solely due to inexperience but to social preferences. Yet, after some 
time all types behave like income-maximizing free riders, even though only the free riders 
types are motivated by selfish income-maximization. Thus, the income-maximizing Nash 
equilibrium of free riding is attained not only because people “adapt their behavior to the 
game they are playing as they gain experience” but because the non-free rider types 
experience being duped by the free riders.  
Our observations on the existence of different types of players may also shed light on 
interesting social issues. For instance, expectations on how others vote can shape voting 
behavior (Tyran 2004). The work morale that co-workers exhibit might influence behavior at 
the work place (e.g., Falk and Ichino, forthcoming), while motivations similar to conditional 
cooperation and free riding might also affect corruption (Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner 
2002). Similarly, conditional cooperation and free rider incentives might also shape the 
tendency to follow a leader's example in team work (Gächter and Renner 2004; Güth, Levati, 
Sutter, and van der Heijden 2004; Potters, Sefton and Vesterlund 2004), and others' actions 
might also govern contributions to charity (e.g., Falk 2004; Frey and Meier 2004; Shang and 
Croson 2005). 
Policy consequences might differ if, in fact, most people are conditional cooperators or 
free riders rather than if they contribute for reasons of a “warm glow” or errors (see Gächter 
2005 for a more comprehensive discussion). The latter are motives that are independent of 
other people’s contribution behavior, whereas conditional cooperation is contingent behavior. 
For instance, observers of welfare state policies point out that many people hold reciprocity 
norms that are akin to the conditional cooperation observed in our experiments. Fong et al. 
(2004) even argue that “people support the welfare state because it conforms to deeply held 
norms of reciprocity and conditional obligations to others”. People resist paying welfare to 
individuals who could support themselves but who instead cheat or free ride. Norms of 
reciprocity and conditional cooperation might also influence tax morale; too many cheaters 
can spoil tax morale. People might be more likely not to cheat on their taxes if others honestly 
pay theirs (e.g., Besley and Coate 1992; Andreoni et al. 1998; Feld and Tyran 2002). Policies 
not only affect the incentives people face, but also influence their beliefs about others, which, 
as our results show, also strongly shape behavior.     
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Appendix A: Instructions for the experiment 
This is a translation of the original German version. We present the instructions of the P-C experiments here; 
those of the C-P experiments were adapted accordingly. They are available upon request. 
 
Instructions for the P-Experiment 
You are now taking part in an economics experiment financed by the Swiss Science Foundation. If you read the 
following instructions carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – earn some more money in addition to 
the 10 Francs, which you can keep in any case. The entire amount of money which you earned with your 
decisions will be added up and paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. These instructions are solely for 
your private information. You are not allowed to communicate during the experiment. If you have any 
questions, please ask us. Violation of this rule will lead to the exclusion from the experiment and all payments. If 
you have questions, please raise your hand. A member of the experimenter team will come to you and answer 
them in private. 
We will not speak of Francs during the experiment, but rather of points. Your whole income will first be 
calculated in points. At the end of the experiment, the total amount of points you earned will be converted to 
Francs at the following rate: 
1 point = 35 centimes. 
All participants will be divided in groups of four members. Except for us - the experimenters - no one knows 
who is in which group. 
We describe the exact experiment process below.  
The decision situation 
You will learn how the experiment will be conducted later. We first introduce you to the basic decision situation. 
You will find control questions at the end of the description of the decision situation that help you to understand 
the decision situation. 
You will be a member of a group consisting of 4 people. Each group member has to decide on the allocation of 
20 points. You can put these 20 points into your private account or you can invest them fully or partially into a 
project. Each point you do not invest into the project, will automatically remain in your private account. 
 
Your income from the private account: 
You will earn one point for each point you put into your private account. For example, if you put 20 points 
into your private account (and therefore do not invest into the project) your income will amount to exactly 20 
points out of your private account. If you put 6 points into your private account, your income from this account 
will be 6 points. No one except you earns something from your private account. 
Your income from the project 
Each group member will profit equally from the amount you invest into the project. On the other hand, you 
will also get a payoff from the other group members' investments. The income for each group member will be 
determined as follows: 
 
Income from the project = sum of all contributions × 0.4 
 
If, for example, the sum of all contributions to the project is 60 points, then you and the other members of your 
group each earn 60 × 0.4 = 24 points out of the project. If four members of the group contribute a total of 10 
points to the project, you and the other members of your group each earn 10 × 0.4 = 4 points. 
Total income: 
Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account and that from the project: 
Income from your private account (= 20 – contribution to the project) 
+ Income from the project (= 0.4 × sum of all contributions to the project) 
Total income 
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Control questions: 
Please answer the following control questions. They will help you to gain an understanding of the calculation of 
your income, which varies with your decision about how you distribute your 20 points. Please answer all the 
questions and write down your calculations. 
1. Each group member has 20 points. Assume that none of the four group members (including you) contributes 
anything to the project. 
 What will your total income be? ___________ 
 What will the total income of the other group members be? ___________ 
2. Each group member has 20 points. You invest 20 points in the project. Each of the other three members of 
the group also contributes 20 points to the project. 
 What will your total income be? ___________ 
 What will the total income of the other group members be? ___________ 
3. Each group member has 20 points. The other 3 members contribute a total of 30 points to the project. 
 a) What will your total income be, if you – in addition to the 30 points – invest 0 points into the project? 
  Your Income ___________ 
 b) What will your total income be, if you – in addition to the 30 points – invest 8 points into the project? 
  Your Income  ___________ 
 c) What will your total income be, if you – in addition to the 30 points – invest 15 points into the project? 
  Your Income  ___________ 
4.  Each group member has 20 points at his or her disposal. Assume that you invest 8 points to the project. 
 a) What is your total income if the other group members – in addition to your 8 points – contribute another 
7 points to the project? 
  Your Income ___________ 
 b) What is your total income if the other group members – in addition to your 8 points – contribute another 
12 points to the project? 
  Your Income ___________ 
 c) What is your income if the other group members – in addition to your 8 points – contribute another 22 
points to the project? 
  Your Income ___________ 
 
The Experiment 
The experiment includes the decision situation just described to you. You will be paid at the end of the 
experiment based on the decisions you make in this experiment. The experiment will only be conducted once. As 
you know, you will have 20 points at your disposal. You can put them into a private account or you can invest 
them into a project. Each subject has to make two types of decisions in this experiment, which we will refer to 
below as the “unconditional contribution” and “contribution table”. 
• You decide how many of the 20 points you want to invest into the project in the unconditional contribution. 
Please indicate your contribution in the following computer screen: 
 
 
After you have determined your unconditional contribution, please click “OK”. 
Help 
Please enter your unconditional contribution to the 
project. Press "OK" when you are done. 
Your unconditional contribution 
to the project 
1 of 1 Remaining time [sec]Period 
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• Your second task is to fill in a “contribution table” where you indicate how many tokens you want to 
contribute to the project for each possible average contribution of the other group members (rounded 
to the next integer). You can condition your contribution on that of the other group members. This will be 
immediately clear to you if you take a look at the following table. This table will be presented to you in the 
experiment: 
 
 
The numbers are the possible (rounded) average contributions of the other group members to the project. You 
simply have to insert how many tokens you will contribute to the project into each input box – conditional on the 
indicated average contribution. You have to make an entry into each input box. For example, you will have to 
indicate how much you contribute to the project if the others contribute 0 tokens to the project, how much you 
contribute if the others contribute 1, 2, or 3 tokens, etc. You can insert any integer numbers from 0 to 20 in 
each input box. Once you have made an entry in each input box, click “OK”. 
After all participants of the experiment have made an unconditional contribution and have filled in their 
contribution table, a random mechanism will select a group member from every group. Only the contribution 
table will be the payoff-relevant decision for the randomly determined subject. Only the unconditional 
contribution will be the payoff-relevant decision for the other three group members not selected by the 
random mechanism. You obviously do not know whether the random mechanism will select you when you make 
your unconditional contribution and when you fill in the contribution table. You will therefore have to think 
carefully about both types of decisions because both can become relevant for you. Two examples should make 
this clear. 
EXAMPLE 1: Assume that the random mechanism selects you. This implies that your relevant decision 
will be your contribution table. The unconditional contribution is the relevant decision for the other three 
group members. Assume they made unconditional contributions of 0, 2, and 4 tokens. The average contribution 
of these three group members, therefore, is 2 tokens. If you indicated in your contribution table that you will 
contribute 1 token if the others contribute 2 tokens on average, then the total contribution to the project is given 
by 0+2+4+1=7 tokens. All group members, therefore, earn 0.4×7=2.8 points from the project plus their 
respective income from the private account. If, instead, you indicated in your contribution table that you would 
contribute 19 tokens if the others contribute two tokens on average, then the total contribution of the group to the 
project is given by 0+2+4+19=25. All group members therefore earn 0.4×25=10 points from the project plus 
their respective income from the private account. 
EXAMPLE 2: Assume that the random mechanism did not select you, implying that the unconditional 
contribution is taken as the payoff-relevant decision for you and two other group members. Assume your 
unconditional contribution is 16 tokens and those of the other two group members are 18 and 20 tokens. Your 
average unconditional contribution and that of the two other group members, therefore, is 18 tokens. If the group 
member whom the random mechanism selected indicates in her contribution table that she will contribute 1 
token if the other three group members contribute on average 18 tokens, then the total contribution of the group 
to the project is given by 16+18+20+1=55 tokens. All group members will therefore earn 0.4×55=22 points from 
the project plus their respective income from the private account. If, instead, the randomly selected group 
member indicates in her contribution table that she contributes 19 if the others contribute on average 18 tokens, 
Help: Enter the amount which you want to contribute to the project if the others make 
the average contribution which stands to the left of the entry field. When you have 
completed your entries, press "OK". 
1 of 1 
Your conditional contribution to the project 
Remaining time [sec] Period 
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then the total contribution of that group to the project is 16+18+20+19=73 tokens. All group members will 
therefore earn 0.4×73=29.2 points from the project plus their respective income from the private account. 
 
The random selection of the participants will be implemented as follows. Each group member is assigned a 
number between 1 and 4. As you remember, a participant, namely the one with the number 11, was randomly 
selected at the very beginning of the experiment. This participant will throw a 4-sided die after all participants 
have made their unconditional contribution and have filled out their contribution table. The resulting number will 
be entered into the computer. If participant 11 throws the membership number that was assigned to you, then 
your contribution table will be relevant for you and the unconditional contribution will be the payoff-relevant 
decision for the other group members. Otherwise, your unconditional contribution is the relevant decision. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Instructions for the C-Experiment 
 
We will now conduct another experiment. This experiment lasts 10 periods, in which you and the other group 
members have to make decisions. As in the other experiment, every group consists of 4 people. The formation of 
the group changes at random after every period. So your group consists of different people in all 10 periods. 
The whole experiment is finished after these 10 periods,. 
 
The decision situation is the same as that described on page 2 of the instructions of the previous experiment. 
Each member of the group has to decide about the usage of the 20 points. You can put these 20 points into your 
private account or you can invest them fully or partially into a project. Each point you do not invest into the 
project is automatically placed into your private account. Your income will be determined in the same way as 
before. Reminder: 
 
   
 Income from your private account (= 20 – contribution to the project)  
 + Income from the project (= 0.4 × sum of all contributions to the project)  
 Total income  
 1 point = 7 centimes!  
 
The decision screen, which you will see in every period, looks like this: 
 
As you can see, you have to make two inputs: 
 
1. First you have to decide on your contribution to the project, that is, you have to decide how many of the 
20 points you want to contribute to the project, and how many points you want to put into your private 
account. This decision is the same as the unconditional contribution of the previous experiment. You only 
make unconditional decisions in this experiment. There is no contribution table. 
 
Help 
Press "OK" when you have completed your entries 
What is your estimate of the average contribution from the OTHER group 
members in this period (rounded to an integer? 
Your contribution to the project 
Your endowment 
Remaining time [sec] 1 of 10 Period 
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2. Afterwards you have to estimate the average contribution to the project (rounded to an integer) of the other 
three group members of this period. You will be paid for the accuracy of your estimate: 
 
• If your estimate is exactly right (that is, if your estimate is exactly the same as the actual average 
contribution of the other group members), you will get 3 points in addition to your other income from 
the experiment. 
• If your estimate deviates by one point from the correct result, you will get 2 additional points. 
• A deviation by 2 points still earns you 1 additional point. 
• If your estimate deviates by 3 or more points from the correct result, you will not get any additional 
points. 
 
After these 10 periods are over, the whole experiment is finished and you will receive: 
 
 + your income from the first experiment 
 + your income from the second experiment (including your income from your correct estimates) 
 = total income from both experiments 
 
 + 10 Francs show up fee ! 
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Appendix B: Scatterplots 
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Note: Solid lines are locally weighted regressions of contributions on beliefs (with least-squares smoothing) 
using the “lowess” command in Stata 8.2. Observations are jittered (using a jitter-factor of 3).  
